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(NATIONAL) TRADEMARK LAWS AND
THE (NON-NATIONAL) DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM
GRAEME B. DINWOODIE*
1. INTRODUCTION
This Symposium has explored several ways in which
cyberspace has challenged existing legal boundaries.
Boundaries take many forms. When we talk of boundaries in
relation to cyberspace, we may readily assume that the term
has merely spatial significance.
Spatial or geographic
boundaries are inevitably challenged by the Internet, which
(as yet)1 knows no geographic limits. And thus the Internet
intensifies the clash of dueling legislative competencies that
globalization more generally has brought to the fore. These
clashes occur not only among different countries (horizontal
clashes), but also among national, international, and
supranational bodies (vertical clashes). To what extent, and
according to what principles, can national rules work in a
non-national setting?2 Must the rules governing cyberspace
* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. Copyright 2000, Graeme B.
Dinwoodie. This Essay reflects discussions with participants in the Symposium
organized by the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law,
Exploring Legal Boundaries Within Cyberspace: What Law Controls in a Global
Marketplace?, in March 2000. My thanks to all those who provoked or commented
on these musings. I am also very grateful to Brian Havel and Larry Helfer for
comments on a draft of this Essay.
1 Technologies being developed may permit Internet users to confine their
online relations to other persons from particular jurisdictions. See Denise Caruso,
Digital Commerce: Control over Content, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2000, at C4 (reporting that
the response of iCraveTV.com to complaints concerning its activities, permissible in
Canada but prohibited in the United States, was to pursue technological measures
that would bar U.S. users from accessing the Canadian website, thus creating
“country-area networks”).
2 Consider, for example, the recent experience of Yahoo! in the French courts.
The sale of Nazi memorabilia is illegal in many parts of Europe, including France,
but not in the United States. A French organization filed suit in France against
Yahoo! for permitting auctions of Nazi memorabilia on its U.S. site (no such
auctions took place on Yahoo!’s French site, http://www.yahoo.fr), and the French
court ordered Yahoo! to block French consumers from access to the auctions on the
U.S. site. Yahoo! has posted warnings in French on its U.S. site in order to alert
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be decoupled from national legislatures and courts to be
effective or legitimate? This is a hugely complex question to
which scholars and policymakers are devoting substantial
attention across all fields of inquiry, including many areas of
law.3
But legal boundaries of other sorts may also be
challenged by developments in cyberspace. For example, as
I will explain in more detail below, for over a century the
United States has steadfastly resisted adoption of a
registration-based system of trademark priority and has
adhered instead to a use-based philosophy. This philosophy
establishes a variety of boundaries for trademark law, many
of which are challenged by the Internet. Indeed, one could
regard the use/registration boundary itself, which separates
U.S. trademark law from the trademark law of almost all
other countries, as a boundary that is threatened by
cyberspace developments. This boundary has, of course,
developed out of and been sustained by geographic
boundaries, but it is important to recognize that any inquiry
into “what law controls in cyberspace” must probe not only
the quasi-adjectival question of which legal system or body
French users of the restrictions under French law but has argued that it is
technologically impossible to ensure that French users cannot access the U.S. site.
See Association Union des Étudiants Juifs de France, la Ligue Contre le Racisme et
l’Antisémitisme v. Yahoo! Inc. et Yahoo France, T.G.I. Paris, Ordonnance de référé
du 22 mai 2000, http://www.legalis.net/jnet/decisions/responsabilite/ord_tgiparis_220500.htm; see also Internet: Yahoo! Appeals French Court Decision Banning Sites
Selling Nazi Memorabilia, BNA INT’L BUS. & FIN. DAILY, June 12, 2000, LEXIS,
News Library, Individual Publication File.
3 See, e.g., WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE WORLD, READY OR NOT: THE MANIC
LOGIC OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM (1997) (criticizing globalization for failing to
consider a full range of social values and questioning the legitimacy of efforts to
develop global governance structures without consideration of all those values).
Within the legal profession, the American Bar Association established a Global
Cyberspace Jurisdiction Project in 1998 to consider the appropriate jurisdictional
rules to govern electronic commerce.
See A.B.A. GLOBAL CYBERSPACE
JURISDICTION PROJECT, ACHIEIVING LEGAL AND BUSINESS ORDER IN
CYBERSPACE 19-20 (LONDON MEETING DRAFT) (July 2000) (recommending the
establishment of a global commission to investigate the issues upon which there is a
“global
consensus”),
at
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/cyber/initiatives/jurisdiction.html. In 1998, the
World Intellectual Property Organization convened a conference on the private
international aspects of copyright law and the Internet, and a similar conference on
all aspects of intellectual property and electronic commerce is scheduled for January
2001 in Geneva.
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has legislative competence over a particular legal issue, but
also the effect that cyberspace will have on the content of
the substantive law that will control activities in cyberspace.
Philosophical and conceptual boundaries may fall just as fast
as geographic boundaries.
In this Essay, I will explore the dual dimension to
boundary erosion by considering the effect that one
particular aspect of cyberspace activity—the registration and
use of domain names—has had and may have on trademark
law. We will see that this analysis challenges not only
traditional notions of national legislative competence, but also
enables us to reconsider basic debates about trademark law.
I will try to confine my thoughts to the broader systemic
significance of the clash that has occurred between domain
names and trademarks; the pace of change in this area is so
rapid that a detailed analysis of current law, though
fascinating, would soon be of purely historical interest.
2. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN TRADEMARK AND DOMAIN NAME REGIMES
What precisely is the conflict between trademarks and
domain names? Before examining the conflict in detail and
the different ways in which it might be addressed, I should
identify the characteristics of the two systems with which we
are dealing. Domain names are the unique addresses
assigned to particular computers that are connected to the
Internet. Without such unique addresses, computers would
not be able to send packets of information to the correct
The naming system, and the history of its
location.4
development, are well-explained elsewhere.5 For our current
purposes, four aspects of the system are pertinent. First,
domain names currently say very little about the nature or
location of the domain name registrant. Every domain name
has a top-level domain name (the suffix at the end of the
4 The actual Internet addresses (Internet Protocol addresses) are unique
numbers, each with an assigned corresponding unique name in order to deal with
the frailty of human memory. Thus, the Internet address of the University of
Pennsylvania is actually 128.91.2.28, but it is easier to remember the name that
corresponds to that number, namely, www.upenn.edu.
5 See generally Joseph P. Liu, Legitimacy and Authority in Internet Coordination: A
Domain Name Case Study, 74 IND. L.J. 587 (1999) (discussing the history of domain
name system and proposals for reform).
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domain name) that will consist of either a generic top-level
domain name (such as .edu or .com)6 or a country code
(such as .uk, for the United Kingdom, or .it, for Italy).7 But,
as presently constituted, even the top-level domain name is
not determinative of the nature or location of the registrant
in question. Although the registrars responsible for country
code registers may impose residency requirements,8 domain
names are available in the generic top-level domains
regardless of physical location9 and many country code
registrars are not insistent on residency requirements.10 And,
while the four principal generic top-level domains were once
indicative of the nature of the domain name’s owner (.edu
signified educational institutions, .gov was found at the end
of government agency addresses, .com was used by
commercial enterprises, and .mil was restricted to military
users),11 the expansion of users and an open registration
6 The present generic top-level domain names include .edu, .com, .gov, .org,
.net, .int, and .mil. As discussed below, the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) has proposed the creation of a variety of new
top-level domain names. See infra text accompanying notes 75-76.
7 The administration of country code top-level domains is delegated by
ICANN (performing the functions formerly performed by the Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority (“IANA”)) to authorities (“managers”) in the relevant country.
For resolution of a recent controversy on the question, see IANA, IANA REPORT
ON REQUEST FOR DELEGATION OF .PS TOP-LEVEL DOMAIN (Mar. 22, 2000)
(concluding that the .ps domain should be delegated to managers in the Palestinian
Authority and approving the managers for that purpose), at http://www.
icann.org/general/ps-report-22mar00.htm.
8 See
ASSOCIATION FRANÇAISE POUR LE NOMMAGE INTERNET EN
COOPÉRATION (“AFNIC”), NAME ALLOCATION CHARTER FOR THE .FR AREA, at
http://www.nic.fr/english/register/charter.html (listing conditions on name
registration in the .fr country code domain) (last visited Oct. 19, 2000).
9 Indeed, registrars of the names in the generic top-level domains have
marketed .com domain based on its global characteristics. See Precision Marketing: Net
Dot Com Owner Spins a European Web, PRECISION MKT. 5 (Apr. 5, 1999), 1999 WL
8938619.
10 Some country code domains have become attractive for reasons unrelated to
geography. For example, doctors in the United States are purchasing names in the
Moldova country code domain, namely, .md. See U.S. Companies Dominate This
Country Name Game, USA TODAY, Aug. 22, 2000, at 3D; see also Jane Black, Tiny
Tuvalu Profits from Web Name, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2000, at C2 (reporting that the
Pacific island of Tuvalu had sold the right to control registration of names in its .tv
country code domain to a Canadian entrepreneur).
11 See IANA, REQUEST FOR COMMENTS (“RFC”) 1591, at 1 (March 1994)
(describing the top-level domain structure), at http://www.isi.edu/innotes/rfc1591.txt.
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system have reduced the value of the suffix as an indicium of
the nature of the user (except for .edu, .gov, and .mil).12
Second, and related to the lack of connection between
address and location, because the accreditation of registrars
is performed by a single body, ICANN,13 there is close to (but
not complete)14 uniformity of registration practices among
registrars, at least with respect to the generic top-level
domains. Third, within each top-level domain, there cannot
be two identical names, or computers would not know where
to send information. Thus, while there may be separate
domain name registrations of apple.com and apple.net, there
cannot be two domain name registrations of apple.com.
Finally, domain names are registered on a first-come, firstserved basis. There can only be one apple.com, and it goes
to the first person to register it. The only check, on initial
application, is whether an identical name is already registered
in that domain.
In some ways, the allocation of domain names may
appear to evade the dilemmas presented by cyberspace in
other areas of regulation, many of which (such as tax or
securities law) have been discussed in this Symposium. In
particular, because the domain name system is an element of
the architecture of the Internet, domain names would appear
inevitably linked to the non-national vehicle of the Internet;
12 See
ICANN, NEW TLD APPLICATION PROCESS OVERVIEW, at
http://www.icann.org/tlds/application-process-03aug00.htm (posted Aug. 3, 2000)
(noting that while RFC 1591 states that .com, .net, and .org “are intended for
various uses . . . [a]s a practical matter, however, anyone may register and use names
in these domains for any purpose.” Indeed, many trademark owners will seek to
register—or stop others from registering—a domain name incorporating their
trademark in several of the generic top-level domains.).
13 ICANN is a not-for-profit corporation that was created by the U.S.
government to operate the domain name system, among other things, in accordance
with parameters set by the Commerce Department. See Management of Internet
Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741 (proposed June 10, 1998).
14 The flexibility that causes slightly different practices among registrars reflects
the notion that the system of registering generic top-level domain names would
benefit from competition in the registration process. This was an important part of
the shift from administration of the system by Network Solutions, Inc. For a
description of Network Solutions, Inc., see infra note 51. There is less uniformity
among registrars of names in the different country code domains, but again there is
some standardization within a particular country code domain. See U.S. Companies
Dominate This Country Name Game, supra note 10, at 3D (noting different registration
practices within different country code domains).
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registration can be made in top-level domains without regard
to national status or location. And, names are not allocated
by national governments.15 Finally, unlike other activities
(such as the issuance or trading of securities), no differing
national regulatory domain name regimes have previously
been established. The domain name system thus appears to
be a ripe candidate for an approach transcending national
regulation.
This impression changes, however, when trademarks are
used as domain names.
Intellectual property rights
traditionally have been national in nature, and there are only
a few derogations from this territorialist philosophy.16
Indeed, the leading international intellectual property treaties
affirm this basic proposition.
Trademark rights in one
country are independent of trademark rights in other
countries: for example, a trademark registration in France
secures rights in France, but a different person may own the
rights to the same mark for the same goods in the United
States. International treaties have sought to minimize the
problems that territorialism causes by facilitating
multinational registration,17 protecting marks beyond the
15 National governments are more likely to be involved in the management of
country code domains. But the manager of a country code domain need not be a
national governmental organization. The appropriate managers of the country code
domains are determined in accordance with principles set out in a document
(referred to as ICP-1) entitled “Internet Domain Name System Structure and
Delegation,” at http://www.icann.org/icp/icp-1.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2000).
This was issued in May 1999 to reflect then current policies of the Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority in the administration of delegations to manage country code
domains. And many managers are wholly unrelated to the national government. Cf.
id. at 2 (noting that “the desires of the government of a country with regard to
delegation of a [country code top-level domain] are taken very seriously. . .
Significantly interested parties in the domain should agree that the proposed [toplevel domain] manager is the appropriate party.”).
16 The most notable of these is the Community Trade Mark available from the
European Union. See Council Regulation 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on The
Community Trademark, 1994 O.J. (L 11) 1 [hereinafter the Trademark Regulation].
The Trademark Regulation put in place a system under which an applicant may, by
filing a single application, obtain a Community Trade Mark registration (“CTM”)
according rights throughout the entire territory of the European Union.
17 See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, as revised at
Stockholm, 1967, art. 4, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (establishing rights of
priority); see also Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of
Marks, adopted Apr. 14, 1891, 175 C.T.S. 57; Protocol Relating to the Madrid
Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, adopted June 28,
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borders of the country where use or registration occurs if the
mark is well-known elsewhere,18 ensuring that nationals of
foreign countries are equally entitled to register marks as
domestic citizens,19 and mandating certain universal
minimum standards to be implemented in the national law of
all treaty states. These provisions of international trademark
law do little, however, to erode the premise of territoriality;
indeed, the premise underlies every one of these provisions.
The use of nationally delimited trademarks in the nonnationally delimited domain name system thus compels
consideration of which boundaries (if any) are pertinent. So
when trademarks are used as (or as part of) domain names,
the domain name system can no longer avoid the question of
whether national, international, or supranational law should
determine rights where two or more parties have competing
claims. The domain name system must confront the dilemma
facing other areas of regulation, and I will discuss in Section
3 below the different ways in which it is doing that.
As noted above, however, domain names also challenge
the conceptual boundaries of trademark law. To see the
ways in which this is so, let’s briefly explore the conceptual
boundaries of trademark law. A trademark identifies the
goods of one producer and distinguishes them from the
goods of others.20 For example, the mark APPLE on a
personal computer identifies for consumers the source of the
computer produced by Apple and distinguishes it from a
similar product produced by Toshiba. (Service marks do the
same for services, and are protected on essentially the same
basis and for the same reasons).
Preventing rival
competitors from using the term APPLE, or any confusingly
similar term, to identify their rival computers serves useful
social purposes: it protects the goodwill (or consumer
associations) developed by Apple with respect to its product,
1989 (establishing a centralized international filing system to facilitate acquisition of
national trademark rights in several countries).
18 See Paris Convention, supra note 17, art. 6bis; see also Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994 (“TRIPS
Agreement”), art. 16, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments–Results of the Uruguay Round, 33
I.L.M. 81 (1994).
19 See Paris Convention, supra, note 17, art. 2 (mandating national treatment).
20 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994) (defining trademark).
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thus encouraging Apple to generate that goodwill by making
products of consistent quality; and it enables consumers to
receive information about the characteristics of different
products in short (and more efficient) form, thus enabling
more informed purchases by the public, who will not be
deceived into purchasing the wrong computer.
The realization of these two objectives—preservation of
goodwill and protection of consumers—was classically
achieved under U.S. law by the grant of limited rights.
Trademark protection was offered only to terms meeting
certain important conditions, and the scope of protection was
confined to cases of likely confusion. As to the former, a
term would only be protected by trademark law if it were
distinctive: that is, if it constituted a feature by which
consumers would identify and distinguish a product from
others. Absent distinctiveness, the purposes of trademark
protection are not implicated because there would be no
goodwill attaching to the claimed mark and thus no
consumers who would be confused by others using the same
mark.21 Similarly, U.S. law required (and still requires)22 that
the trademark owner use the mark on the goods in respect of
which the rights were claimed. Without use, consumers
would not develop the associations with a single producer
upon which the need for protection is premised. The usebased philosophy of U.S. trademark law, reflected in this
second prerequisite for protection, also affects the rule of
priority: the first producer to use the mark obtains the rights
with respect to the goods upon which and geographical areas
in which use occurred. Most other countries have adopted a
registration-based system of trademark priority: the first to
register the mark obtains the exclusive right to use the mark
on the goods in question.23
21 See Charles Jacquin Et Cie, Inc. v. Destileria Serralles, Inc., 921 F.2d 467, 472
n.5 (3d Cir. 1990) (“A consumer must recognize that a particularly packaged product
comes from Source A before she can be confused by a similar package from Source
B.”).
22 The “intent to use” system introduced in the 1988 Trademark Law Revision
Act enables applications to be made prior to use, but registrations will not be issued
prior to use. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1994) (establishing conditions on issuance of
registration based upon intent to use application).
23 This is not to say that use is irrelevant in registration-based systems. For
example, although use is not required to secure a registration in such systems, it may
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This attention to use by a mark owner also affects
attitudes toward scope of rights, such as a willingness to
grant protection against use on different goods, and from
that a natural receptivity to dilution protection.24 Because
confusion was an essential element to the philosophy
underlying protection, the scope of U.S. trademark rights was
limited both by reference to the products on which the mark
was used and by reference to the geographic area in which
the mark was used. But these limits can also be rationalized
as flowing from the use-based philosophy—the first to use
the mark obtains the rights with respect to the goods upon
which and geographical areas in which use occurred. And
each of these limits also reflected a desire to restrain the
activities of legitimate traders only to the extent necessary to
further the two primary purposes of trademark law. If the
products upon which the mark was used were wholly
different from those of the first mark owner, the public would
not purchase the goods of the second producer believing
them to be those of the first producer. Thus, although Apple
owns the mark APPLE for personal computers, a
manufacturer of shoes could use the mark APPLE on shoes
without affecting the goodwill established by the Apple
company or deceiving consumers in their purchasing
decisions. DOMINO’S is used for both pizzas and sugar
without harm to either company (despite efforts to suggest
otherwise).25 To use an example on the services side, United
Airlines and United Van Lines each own trademark rights in
the mark UNITED, for airline services and moving services,
respectively.26

be required within a set period to maintain a registration or to bring an infringement
proceeding. See GRAEME B. DINWOODIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY (forthcoming 2000).
24 See generally Daniel C. Schulte, The Madrid Trademark Agreement’s Basis in
Registration-Based Systems: Does the Protocol Overcome Past Biases? (Part I), 77 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 595, 608-10 (1995) (discussing several well-recognized
limitations, both on the ability to acquire rights and the scope of rights acquired,
which flow from the use-based philosophy of U.S. trademark law).
25 See Amstar Corp. v. Domino’s Pizza, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 969, 975-80 (5th
Cir. 1980) (permitting coexistence of Domino’s Sugar and Domino’s Pizza because,
inter alia, of differences in goods sufficient to avoid consumer confusion).
26 See U.S. Trademark Registration No. 2017727 (airline); U.S. Trademark
Registration No. 1792966 (moving company).
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Limits on the geographic scope of rights were similarly
motivated: if Apple computer did not use its mark in State A,
then consumers in State A would not come to associate the
mark APPLE with the products made by the Apple company,
and thus the use of the term—even by another computer
producer—would not confuse consumers or endanger any
consumer perceptions of the quality of the product of the
Apple company (because there are no such perceptions).
This geographic limit became much less significant with the
advent of federal trademark registration under the Lanham
Act in 1946 because an application for federal trademark
registration is, if successful, treated as nationwide
constructive use.27
(This development recognizes the
increasingly national nature of trade, and serves to protect
the ability of a producer to expand into other areas of the
United States without having to change its trademark to
avoid infringing local marks.)28 But the principle still operates
periodically to limit the scope of owners’ rights.
The domain name system presents a series of conflicts
with these basic principles of U.S. trademark law. There can
only be one united.com;29 should that domain name be
granted to the airline or the moving company, or should prior
trademark ownership be irrelevant? What is the geographic
scope of use where a trademark is used as a domain name:
has the user now made use of the mark globally, potentially
causing the acquisition of rights in all use-based systems30
and infringement of rights in all countries where the mark is
27 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (1994) (providing that the filing of an application to
register a trademark constitutes constructive use of the mark).
28 The exception to this rule is the good faith remote junior user, who retains
rights in the area of its local use notwithstanding federal registration by another
producer. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 100 (1918)
(noting common law rule and exception).
29 The extent to which this remains a problem may depend on the maintenance
of the current architecture of the Internet. For example, where more than one
trademark holder (or other person) has a legitimate claim to united.com, that address
may take the user to a registrar-administered site listing (and linking to the sites of)
all claimants to the UNITED name, relegating those users to concurrent use of
united.com and exclusive use only of some other configuration including “united”.
30 This would principally be the United States, but even countries operating
registration-based trademark systems may offer some protection to marks used but
not registered under common law principles of passing off or unfair competition.
See DINWOODIE ET AL., supra note 23.
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owned by another?31 Both of these questions implicate
fundamental issues about the continuing role of “use” in
trademark law, a topic upon which the United States
increasingly stands alone in international circles.
The
Internet may increase pressure on the United States to revisit
its longstanding insistence on use as the governing principle
of trademark protection.
The domain name system, and its operation apart from
the trademark system, will also require the courts to develop
new responses to old questions. For example, how does one
assess confusion in cyberspace? The courts must construct a
cyberconsumer, whose purchasing and browsing habits
clearly encompass the use of domain names as well as
trademarks in the searching process.32 And, if use retains
any importance in the system of trademark protection, then
how does one assess whether a trademark is being “used” in
cyberspace: is registration of a domain name the “use of a
mark in commerce” sufficient either to acquire trademark
rights33 or (if that mark is owned by another) to infringe
31 Efforts are underway within the World Intellectual Property Organization to
develop an international approach to the question of when Internet use of a mark
(whether as a domain name or otherwise) will be treated as use within a particular
country. See Standing Comm. on the Law of Trademarks, Industrial Designs and
Geographical Indications, Summary by the Chair, Fifth Session, Geneva, Sept. 1115, 2000, WIPO Doc. SCT/5/5, at 2 (Sept. 15, 2000) (noting Committee discussion
of draft provisions on the protection of trademarks on the Internet and reporting
that the International Bureau would refine the provisions for discussion at the Sixth
Session
of
the
Standing
Committee),
at
http://www.wipo.int/eng/document/sct/index_5.htm; see also Standing Comm. on
the Law of Trademarks, Industrial Designs and Geographical Indications,
Memorandum Prepared by the International Bureau on the Protection of Industrial
Property Rights in Relation to the Use of Signs on the Internet, Fifth Session,
Geneva, Sept. 11-15, 2000, WIPO Doc. SCT/5/2 (June 21, 2000) (discussing draft
provisions, which would require that Internet use have a “commercial effect” in a
particular country before being treated as “use” there, and developing guidelines on
the
meaning
of
“commercial
effect”),
at
http://eforum.wipo.int/sct/eng/docs/sct5_2e.pdf. These discussions have also
encompassed the question of how to accommodate conflicting national rights. See
id.
32 These habits may, however, change as technological options for
cybersearching grow. The use of keywords, available with different browsers, for
example, altered the reliance of consumers on domain names. See Andy JohnsonLaird, Looking Forward, Legislating Backward?, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 95
(2000).
33 See PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
EXAMINATION GUIDE NO. 2-99: MARKS COMPOSED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, OF
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trademark rights? Again, this will require courts to apply
classical principles with an eye to new consumer practices.
Whether and to what extent domain names will serve as
trademarks is not a question of abstract philosophy, but a
matter of how consumer practices and comprehension
develop in cyberspace. Even in the last few years, consumer
attitudes about what a domain name signifies have changed;
trademark law must reflect those changes.
Thus, the different aspects of the domain name system
challenge trademark scholars, policymakers, and courts to
consider fundamental questions about the nature of our
trademark system, as well as the application of traditional
trademark tests to new contexts. But why is this so big a
deal? We have seen that the principles of the trademark
system and the domain name system are different. But why
should that be of concern? The systems are designed to
achieve different results, so their divergence on basic
approaches should be neither surprising nor troubling.
Correct? Perhaps.
Increasingly, the registration and use of domain names is
becoming an integral part of branding (i.e., trademark)
strategies pursued by producers and providers of services.
This is particularly true of service industries. For example, it
is difficult for an airline to compete in the market for websavvy consumers if it does not own the domain name
corresponding to its trademark. United Airlines could register
the domain name flywithunited.com and spend time (and
money) educating consumers that its website with fare
information could be found at that address. But many
consumers have become acclimated to searching initially by
typing in the trademark of the company plus the .com suffix.
Although there are numerous other domain names that
United can register that would connote an airline, preventing
its use of the trademark that it owned would put it at a
competitive disadvantage.34
In short, the differences
DOMAIN NAMES (Sept. 29, 1999) (discussing “issues that commonly arise in the
examination
of
domain
name
mark
applications”),
at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/notices/guide299.htm.
34 Cf. Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 770
(1990) (arguing that because some marks are better than others, competitors without
access to those marks encounter higher information costs and thus barriers to
market entry).
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between the trademark and domain name systems lead to
these (and other)35 social costs ex post; if these are costs
that can be reduced by one system having regard to the
other ex ante, then some coordination is clearly worthwhile.36
3. ADDRESSING THE CONFLICT

3.1.

Spatial Boundaries

Scholars addressing the effect of the Internet on spatial
boundaries have largely concentrated (as one might expect)
on several dichotomous questions. Should problems of
dueling national claims to regulate activities in cyberspace be
solved by national, international, or supranational devices?
Does prescriptive power in cyberspace legitimately belong to
existing offline political institutions or to evolving online
communities?37 Which connection must a state have to an
35 These may arise, most obviously, from the voluminous litigation that we
witnessed starting in the mid-1990s, or from transactions that commercial actors
operating in the digital environment effect to avoid the uncertainty of the clash of
the two systems. Cf. S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 7 (1999) (noting that trademark
owners often purchase domain names containing their trademarks from the
registrant rather than litigate). Other costs might include a significant chilling effect
on political speech as limits on trademark rights taken for granted in the offline
world assume uncertain status online.
36 The examples that I have mentioned raise two separate, but obviously
related, issues. First, to what extent does the domain name system take into account
existing trademark ownership in order to preserve that competitive equilibrium?
Second, prospectively, to what extent should the allocation of domain names and
trademarks be aligned to avoid these problems in the future? Underlying both
questions is a continuing concern about ensuring within any such system sufficient
space for uses by competitors, consumers, and the public that preserve the uses by
these constituencies thought important in the offline environment.
37 Political structures are clearly evolving in cyberspace.
See, e.g., ICANN,
PRELIMINARY REPORT: MEETING OF THE ICANN BOARD IN YOKOHAMA (July 16,
2000) (approving resolution on bylaws regarding membership), at
http://www.icann.org/minutes/prelim-report-16jul00.htm; cf. Farhad Manjoo, Jury
Still Out on Elections, WIRED NEWS (Oct. 11, 2000) (discussing concerns with and
successes of online voting for election to ICANN Board), at
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,39283,00.html. The completeness of
these structures and their capacity to further liberal democratic values, however,
have been well-critiqued. See, e.g., Neil W. Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A
Skeptical View from Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 395, 435 (2000)
(critiquing claim that a self-governing cyberspace would more fully realize liberal
democratic ideals); see also Mark K. Anderson, Chicago to Sue Vote Auctioneers, WIRED
(Oct.
12,
2000),
at
http://www.wired.com/
NEWS
news/politics/0,1283,39431,00.html (reporting lawsuit by election officials in
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issue or dispute in order best to support its claim to regulate
in cyberspace?
The solutions canvassed by scholars addressing these
questions have ranged widely.
Some, such as Jack
Goldsmith, have argued that the question of competing
national prescriptive claims to regulate can be resolved by
application of traditional private law techniques such as
choice of law and jurisdictional analysis.38 Others, such as
David Johnson and David Post, have moved beyond such
techniques and suggested that activities in cyberspace be
regulated by cybernorms of a more universal character.39
Yet others have argued40 that Congress might consider
expanding the jurisdiction of U.S. federal courts to exercise
jurisdiction41 extraterritorially (which the U.S. courts currently
do more readily in trademark cases than they do in copyright
cases42).
In the context of domain name/trademark disputes,
principles have developed at the national, international, and
Chicago against Voteauction.com, a website purporting to auction off 15,000 votes
in the presidential election).
38 Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1201
(1998). On the conceptual rather than spatial side, others have argued that
cyberspace is best regulated by application of existing legal principles, including
those of intellectual property law. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of
the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 208 (1996).
39 See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1378 (1996).
40 See Subcommittee Tackles Jurisdiction Issues on Internet, 60 Pat. Trademark &
Copyright J. (BNA) 214, 215 (July 14, 2000) (reporting testimony of Dan Burk at an
oversight hearing before the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Courts
and Intellectual Property).
41 Even if Congress expanded the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal
courts, U.S. courts have recognized that the Internet has not entirely removed limits
on the constitutional authority of courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over
foreign defendants. See, e.g., Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418 (9th
Cir. 1997) (explaining passive website jurisdictional analysis by several courts);
America Online, Inc. v. Huang, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1560, 1568-69 (E.D. Va.
2000) (holding that registration of a domain name with a registrar based in Virginia
was of itself insufficient contact with Virginia to support personal jurisdiction over
foreign defendant/domain name registrant); BroadBridge Media, L.L.C. v.
Hypercd.com, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
42 See Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism,
37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505, 526 (1997) (“[T]he courts have held that there can be no
violation of U.S. copyright law without an act of infringement within the United
States. . . . [T]his is not the case with respect to U.S. trademark law.”) (citation
omitted).
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supranational levels. Many different national courts have
addressed the registration of domain names including
trademarks by persons other than the mark owner. But while
national courts throughout the world have consistently
offered relief against blatant cybersquatting,43 differences in
the precise contours of national protection are likely to
develop as courts confront more contentious issues in
disputes between competing mark owners or mark owners
and other legitimate users. The issue has been tackled at the
international level by the World Intellectual Property
Organization (“WIPO”). In September 1999, WIPO member
states agreed to a nonbinding resolution calling for the per se
protection of well-known marks against bad faith registration
as part of the domain names of someone other than the
mark owner.44 But, even if this form of “soft law” has the
long-term effect that WIPO hopes, it will simply ensure that
most countries offer basic protection against infringement of
famous marks. Implementation of that protection will remain
a matter for national law, and (as the number of reservations
noted in the resolution suggests) there exists wide
disagreement over the appropriate scope of protection for
marks beyond very basic notions.

43 See, e.g., Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Market, Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 495
(2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 2719 (U.S. June 26, 2000) (No. 99-1752);
Panavision Int’l L.P., v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1322 (9th Cir. 1998); Landgericht
Dusseldorf, GRUR 34 O 191/96 (Apr. 4, 1997), 158 (Germany), reported at 1998
Eur. C.L.Y.B. 963, 963 (May 1998); Yahoo! Inc. v. Akash Arora, [1999] Fleet St.
Rep. 931, 939 (Delhi H.C. 1999) (India). Most recently, courts in China have
offered strong protection against cybersquatting. On June 20, 2000, Beijing No. 2
Intermediate People’s Court IP Chamber upheld a complaint by the Swedish
furniture retailer IKEA and ruled that the domain name registration
www.ikea.com.cn was null and void, and ordered the defendant, CINET, to
withdraw the registration. Although the court noted no specific law in China
governing disputes between trademarks and domain names, it applied the “spirit and
principles” of the law and found that the defendant had violated the spirit of the
Paris Convention and the basic principles of the unfair competition law. See China
IP Express, No. 24 (June 22, 2000) (Rouse & Co. Int’l); see also China IP Express, No.
26 (July 7, 2000) (Rouse & Co. Int’l) (reporting similar case where the court
additionally took into account that the defendant had violated the Interim Rules for
the Registration and Administration of Chinese Domain Names).
44 See Joint Resolution Concerning Provisions on the Protection of WellKnown Marks, art. 6, Gen. Rep. of the Assemblies of the Member States of WIPO,
Thirty-Fourth Series of Meetings, Geneva, Sept. 20-29, 1999, ¶¶ 171-183, WIPO
Doc. A/34/16 (Sept. 29, 1999), at http://www.wipo.int.
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If this were all, national law would remain paramount, as
it still does in almost all other areas of intellectual property
law.45 This would cause reliance on traditional private law
techniques of jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition of
judgments, to localize and adjudicate non-national disputes
before national courts according to national laws. As noted
above, some scholars see this endeavor as scarcely different
from that encountered in any multinational or multistate
context.46 And, to be sure, policy makers and scholars are
working on adapting these techniques for the Internet age.47
But complete reliance on national standards, guided by
traditional choice of law techniques, may be insufficient.
Even if (as some argue) determining the law applicable to a
domain name/trademark clash does indeed bear similarity to
other choice of law dilemmas, at some point differences in
degree become differences in kind. The Internet takes us
across that line. Traditional approaches to choice of law
45 Some supranational rights do exist, such as the CTM. See Council Regulation
40/94 of 20 December 1993 on The Community Trademark, 1994 O.J. (L 11) 1
(“The Trademark Regulation”). Moreover, the incorporation of the international
intellectual property regime within the international trading system, and in particular
within the dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organization
(“WTO”), has made the standards contained in international agreements effective
for the first time. The WTO Dispute Settlement Body has now issued four reports
interpreting the scope of member state obligations under the TRIPS Agreement,
including three published since March 2000. See WTO Panel Report, United
States—Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, Doc. No. WT/DS160/R (June
15, 2000), at http://www.wto.org/wto/ddf/ep/public.html; WTO Panel Report,
Canada—Term of Patent Protection, Doc. No. WT/DS170/R (May 5, 2000), at
http://www.wto.org/wto/ddf/ep/public.html; WTO Panel Report, Canada—
Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, Doc. WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000),
at http://www.wto.org/wto/ddf/ep/public.html; WTO Appellate Body Report,
India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products,
Doc.
WT/DS50/AB/R
(Dec.
19,
1997),
at
http://www.wto.org/wto/ddf/ep/public.html. While these rulings do not directly
effect changes in national law, and rights remain enforceable by private parties only
as permitted by national laws (whether TRIPS compliant or not), the threat of
effective enforcement means that one can with greater confidence now refer to de
facto international legal standards of intellectual property protection. (The
nonbinding resolution of the WIPO member states is not, however, directly
enforceable before a WTO panel. See Joint Resolution Concerning Provisions on
the Protection of Well-Known Marks, supra note 44.)
46 See Goldsmith, supra note 38.
47 See Easterbrook, supra note 38; Goldsmith, supra note 38; Johnson & Post,
supra note 39; Subcommittee Tackles Jurisdiction Issues on Internet, supra note 40; A.B.A.
GLOBAL CYBERSPACE JURISDICTION PROJECT, supra note 3; see also infra text
accompanying note 55 (discussing the draft Hague Convention).
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have significant problems of application and provide little
guidance to courts in the digital environment.48 (Indeed,
where the issue has surfaced in domain name cases brought
before the U.S. courts, the courts have largely ignored the
issue.49) And the aggressive exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction would merely heighten tensions with other
countries and highlight the urgency of more reasoned, and
less parochial, solutions.
On the other hand, the isolated application of
autonomous, universal cybernorms causes other problems.
Just as cyberspace creates spillover effects from one country
to another, it also causes spillover from online to offline
contexts, implicating more than merely cyberinterests.
Online activities have offline consequences, legitimating
online (national) regulation. National interests have a role to
play in the development of international solutions. Passing
over them too quickly disserves a truly international solution
by ignoring helpful laboratories of laws, failing to take
advantage of developed democratic political structures that
nation states (on the whole) provide,50 and ignoring the
legitimate claims of nation states to (partial) legislative
competence.
The domain name system does, however, include a form
of supranational adjudication in addition to the national and
international mechanisms discussed above. When the U.S.
Government established ICANN, it required that ICANN
devise a mandatory uniform dispute resolution policy.51
48 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should
Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000).
49 See Quokka Sports, Inc. v. Cup Int’l Ltd., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1115 (N.D.
Cal. 1999) (granting the licensee of the U.S. trademark for the mark AMERICA’S
CUP a temporary restraining order against the New Zealand operator of a website at
americascup.com, notwithstanding that the use of the mark AMERICASCUP was
lawful under New Zealand law).
50 It is not clear that the different constituencies comprising the fledgling
political structure of ICANN serve as any better proxy than nations for the different
interests that are implicated in this context. And the structure of ICANN raises
many other concerns regarding the body’s legitimacy and representativeness. See
COMMON CAUSE & CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., ICANN’S GLOBAL
ELECTIONS: ON THE INTERNET, FOR THE INTERNET (March 2000), at
http://www.cdt.org/dns/icann/study/icannstudy.pdf.
51 Before the U.S. government established ICANN, responsibility for
registering .com domain names—the most valuable names—lay with Network
Solutions, Inc. (to whom the government had outsourced the job). Network
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Thus, when ICANN accredited additional registrars to
administer the generic top-level domains, it required each
registrar to adopt the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy
(“UDRP”). The UDRP establishes an arbitration process by
requiring domain name registrants to submit to arbitration
before one of the ICANN-approved dispute resolution
providers as a condition of registration. And it contains a set
of principles (both substantive and procedural) according to
which disputes between registrants and mark owners are to
be resolved.
The UDRP holds the promise of supranational laws and
supranational adjudication.52 Indeed, the UDRP has been
seen by some as a model for cross-border enforcement of
rights on the Internet more generally.53 The UDRP, however,
was intended only to put in place quick and cheap
administrative procedures for the easy cases—those
concerning obviously abusive registrations of trademarks as
domain names (loosely, cybersquatting). Some more difficult
problems have been presented (although not always
recognized) by fact patterns already brought before panels.
But as soon as the facts go beyond the easy cases and begin
to embrace contentious issues of trademark law, the UDRP
may be severely tested. For example, trademark protection,
especially for words, collides with free speech concerns.
Although there exists a broad-based international
commitment to the core principles of free speech, different
countries deal with the collision in different ways, reflecting
the wide range of free speech notions that exist around the
Solutions implemented its own dispute resolution policy, which it revised to the
satisfaction of almost no one. For a description of the operation of these different
policies, see Liu, supra note 5, at 606-08.
52 Supranational laws can exist without supranational adjudication (for example,
if national courts seek to uphold supranational principles), and supranational
adjudication can exist without supranational law (if the UDRP panels applied the
national law with the greatest interest, rather than an autonomous set of principles).
See generally Brian F. Havel, The Constitution in an Era of Supranational Adjudication, 78
N.C. L. REV. 257 (2000) (discussing how supranational adjudication can be viewed
as a constitutional exercise of judicial power).
53 See Subcommittee Tackles Jurisdiction Issues on Internet, supra note 40, at 215
(reporting testimony at an oversight hearing before the House Judiciary Committee’s
Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property). As a consequence, the
operation of the UDRP and its broader significance warrants immediate scholarly
attention.
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world once we move beyond those core principles. And the
UDRP system does not presently require us to venture into
the murky waters of enforcement because the remedies
(transfer of domain name) are limited to those that can be
effectuated by the registrars without the aid of national
courts. Finally, expansion of the system would also make
any procedural inequities of the current system more
significant; complaints about these inequities have been
largely ignored given the system’s preoccupation with easy
cases.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the WIPO has recently
recognized that the UDRP would be more difficult to replicate
in areas other than abusive domain name registration
because of the more contested nature of the issues that
would have to be addressed.54 It is in part because of this
that the UDRP system was consciously more limited in reach.
Once vested with adjudicative authority, however, panelists
may move beyond that limited jurisdiction. Indeed, it may be
difficult for panelists to avoid doing so when certain
arguments are made to them. The institutional momentum
may thus take UDRP into cyberwaters that were not
envisaged (or that were even expressly disavowed) as proper
subjects of its attention.
In the short term (and, perhaps, in the longer term),
these uncertainties suggest a need for an amalgam of
national and supranational influences and input. This can
occur at the legislative stage, but to be responsive to the
demands of the fast-changing nature of this area of the law,
it must also occur elsewhere. This includes the use of forms
of supranational adjudication (such as the UDRP), regard for
proper choice of law analysis in all fora, and the development
of more standard rules for the recognition of judgments.55
54 WIPO has begun a new process to consider expansion of the UDRP to new
issues raised by domain name registration. See Press Release, WIPO, WIPO to
Probe New Issues Relating to Domain Name Abuse (July 10, 2000) (announcing a
study, to be conducted at the request of various member states, of whether the
scope of the UDRP should be broadened to address cases such as those involving
personal names of celebrities or geographical indications of origin), available at
http://www.wipo.org/eng/pressrel/2000/p235.htm.
55 Since 1996, the Hague Conference on Private International Law has been
considering a draft Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. See
Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and
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The current system of domain name/trademark litigation,
in large part, reflects this variety of forces. For example,
national courts have continued to offer relief notwithstanding
the UDRP.56
Arbitration under the UDRP is nominally
nonbinding. Filing a claim under the UDRP does not prevent
filing of a complaint before a national court.57 And national
courts can address broader issues than can panelists under
the UDRP. In the United States, the weapons available to
trademark owners (discussed below) were expanded (almost
simultaneously with the commencement of UDRP panels) by
the enactment of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act 1999, codified as Section 43(d) of the Lanham Act.58
Section 43(d) is not coterminous with the UDRP, nor does
Commercial Matters (adopted by Special Commission on Oct. 30, 1999), available at
http://www. hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.html. A diplomatic conference to
adopt the convention had been scheduled for late 2000, but the United States
indicated its unease with the current draft (which is closely modeled on the Brussels
Convention that operates within Europe), and adoption will not occur until 2001 at
the earliest. See Negotiations at the Hague Conf. for a Convention on Jurisdiction
and the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Civil Rights Before the House
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the
H.R., 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Jeffrey D. Kovar, Assistant Legal Adviser
for Private International Law, U.S. Department of State), available at
http://www.house.gov /judiciary/kova0629.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2000).
Although the Convention would address both jurisdiction and recognition of
judgments, the interest of the United States lies primarily in the development of
recognition rules. At present, U.S. courts are far more generous in recognizing
foreign judgments than are foreign courts in recognizing and enforcing U.S.
judgments. The quid pro quo for this improvement would be changes (i.e.,
restrictions) to the bases upon which U.S. courts could assume jurisdiction over civil
disputes. For an analysis of the convention debate, see Kevin M. Clermont,
Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 89, 97-123 (1999).
56 See supra text accompanying note 43 (noting different national decisions).
57 See BroadBridge Media, L.L.C. v. Hypercd.com, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426,
1428-29 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that the pendency of an arbitration under the
UDRP does not foreclose a concurrent court action under the Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act); Weber-Stephen Prods. v. Armitage Hardware & Bldg.
Supply, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1766, 1768 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (holding that
administrative decisions under the UDRP are not intended to be binding on federal
courts); UDRP Rule 4(k) (establishing that a proceeding under the UDRP does not
preclude either party from pursuing an action in a court of competent jurisdiction).
Despite this, since its introduction, the UDRP has often been the primary avenue
for recovery of a domain name. The contractual basis of the proceedings, see supra
text accompanying notes 51-52, and the crucial (if limited) nature of the relief
available (i.e., the transfer of the domain name) undoubtedly have contributed to
that popularity with mark owners. Troublesome questions of enforcing court
judgments against registrars in other countries are sidestepped.
58 See infra text accompanying note 72.
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either of those provisions parallel precisely Section 43 as it
stood before 1999. These differences minimize the chance
that any one regime could become supreme in regulating the
domain name/trademarks clash.59
And this may be
appropriate both in terms of democratic legitimacy and in
working toward an appropriate and effective non-national
solution to a problem that is largely (but not wholly) nonnational in nature.

3.2.

Conceptual Boundaries

Trademark law, especially in use-based systems such as
the United States, is generally cautious about the
dispensation of rights. Trademark rights are granted only
when the term in question assumes certain affirmative
characteristics (if they act as source-identifiers); absent such
characteristics, the mark is insufficiently important to protect,
because protecting it would restrain the use by others for no
gain in terms of informational shortcuts. Similarly, some
marks or devices are too important to protect by trademark,
either because their allocation to a single market participant
would be anticompetitive or would collide with other
important values such as the First Amendment or the
integrity of the patent system. The domain name, as we saw
above, is not nearly as cautious. It dispenses rights with
abandon.
The clash between these two systems could be dealt with
simply by assimilating one system to the other. Assimilation
to the trademark system (or, at least, to the trademark
system of the United States) would involve the erection of
barriers or hurdles to the registration of domain names. It
might take the form, for example, of requiring domain name
registrars to conduct searches akin to trademark clearance
searches before registering a domain name. But this would
duplicate the role of the trademark authorities and would
impose costs on an activity (domain name registration)
whose ease and inexpensiveness has contributed to the rapid

59 The extent to which national alternatives are used will depend in large part
on whether they are more favorable to mark owners than the non-national UDRP
system. Cf. Dinwoodie, supra note 48 (discussing similar dynamic with respect to
arbitration of copyright disputes).
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pace of Internet development.60 Large costs would slow
down that development (although there may be a time when
some slowdown is appropriate). A somewhat less costly
alternative would be to require a search for the precise string
of alphanumeric symbols and to deny domain name
registration to any application that consists of such a term.
Trademark owners have sought this form of protection at
different stages of the construction of the domain name
system. Although this would keep costs lower by reducing
the discretionary part of any search function, it would provide
stronger rights than even the current form of dilution
protection because it would grant plenary rights in words;
even dilution analysis involves consideration of the goods in
question, and, in any event, is available only to famous
marks.61 (This latter alternative might also alter parasitic
activity only marginally, by encouraging “typosquatting”
rather than “pure” cybersquatting.62)
Moreover, in any proposal to assimilate the domain name
system to the trademark system, the national nature of
trademarks becomes problematic. Against which register
60 One smaller aspect of such an assimilation might be to prevent the
registration of generic terms, but this too would add costs. This differs from the
famous name proposal in that it would prevent the registration of generic names by
any domain name registrant; the famous mark proposal would reserve the domain
name for the mark owner.
61 Restricting this domain name filter to famous marks would introduce a
discretionary feature to registration analysis and would increase registration costs.
Also, it also might not be much of a filter if early cases under the federal dilution law
are any guide. Many of these cases paid scant attention to the famousness
requirement. See Lori Krafte-Jacobs, Comment, Judicial Interpretation of the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 659, 690 (1998) (discussing
approach to the requirement of fame in the first federal dilution cases). One
alternative might be to construct an international register of famous or well-known
marks, administered by WIPO, to which registrars could turn. The device of such a
register was considered, well before the domain name issue became a focus of
attention, by the WIPO Committee of Experts on Well-Known Marks (meeting in
Geneva in 1995 and 1996). It was not pursued in the resolution that represented the
culmination (thus far) of that Committee of Experts process, but it has been revived
in the domain name debate. See Joint Resolution Concerning Provisions on the
Protection of Well-Known Marks, supra note 44, ¶¶ 171-183.
62 The term was coined by Andy Johnson-Laird. See Johnson-Laird, supra note
32, at 101 (defining “typosquatting” as the act, by companies, of registering
mistyped variations of popular domain names to “catch the electronic crumbs
dropped by careless web surfers”). Whether typosquatting should be regarded as
actionable under the Lanham Act may depend in large part on how courts develop
the notion of cyberconsumer confusion.
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should the domain name be compared? One option would be
to create international registers, which might work where the
exclusion is of a small number of terms, such as those that
are either generic or well-known. Another would be to mimic
the structure of the (supranational) European Union
Community Trademark (“CTM”) and permit registration only
when no conflicting right appears in any country; if a
conflicting right appears, the registrant would be restricted to
national country code domains. But the cost of clearing
marks remains a problem with the CTM,63 so this may be a
particularly unhelpful model. And the need to clear a domain
name from conflicting rights everywhere is simply too
arduous to contemplate. Does this suggest, therefore, that
the assimilation must be of trademark law to the system of
domain name allocation?
Assimilating trademark law to the domain name system
would require a significant change in our trademark law. It
would require a change (in U.S. law) to a first-to-file system,
and it would require consideration of assigning rights on
something other than a national basis. With respect to
domain names including existing marks, there would be too
many potential owners based on their national rights. Who
would get to own the UNITED mark? The first to file the
domain name registration in the .com domain? In the .net
domain? Would national mark owners with legitimate claims
to the UNITED mark have to forfeit their marks? And, even
prospectively, do we wish trademark rights in words, the
legitimacy of which depends in large part on the porous
nature of such rights, to be strengthened in line with the
truly exclusive character of domain names? Trademarks are
an increasingly important part of both political and
commercial speech, and the absolutism of the domain name
system does not accommodate these countervailing
concerns. If trademark law dispensed rights as liberally as
does the domain name system—giving rights in the generic
term “loan” to money lenders, for example—the competitive
climate would be significantly affected. Trademark law,
which affects more than just the right to select one’s Internet
63 Cf. Coralie Smets-Gary & Katharina Von Woellwarth, Pros and Cons of a
Community Trademark, 20 FRANCHISE L.J. 17, 20 (2000) (discussing cost and other
disadvantages of the CTM).
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address, properly recognizes that some words are just too
important for sole ownership, either because such words
appropriate an entire product market to a single producer or
because such words cannot serve a trademark function for
consumers.64
Alternatively, therefore, one may recognize that the
domain name system and the trademark system can operate
in tandem: first, by assigning domain names on a basis
designed to facilitate Internet development; and second, by
applying trademark principles to acts of domain name
registration that impact trademark rights.65
The initial
response of courts in the United States to the clash between
domain name owners and mark owners has mirrored this
approach. Courts have used not only classical principles of
trademark law but also trademark dilution protection. With
respect to the latter, the courts have interpreted the federal
dilution statute in ways that have had the effect of protecting
trademark rights broadly in the digital environment. It was
only later that Congress, through specific federal legislation,
enacted separate rights specifically designed to protect mark
owners against cybersquatting.66
A claim for trademark infringement or dilution requires
that the defendant has used the mark within the meaning of
the Lanham Act. Although registration of a domain name
does not of itself constitute use in commerce, early U.S.
courts addressing domain name/trademark conflicts stretched
the notion of use in commerce to cover egregious
cybersquatting activities.67 The lack of any real use made it
difficult to fashion a claim of consumer confusion (although
clearly such a claim is possible where the domain name
64 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Reconceptualizing the Inherent Distinctiveness of Product
Design Trade Dress, 75 N.C. L. REV. 471, 597-602 (1997) (discussing these two
rationales for the doctrine of generic marks and comparing to the doctrine of
functionality).
65 Some commentators have doubted whether this approach is likely to develop
in light of statutory and international developments. See Jessica Litman, The DNS
Wars: Trademarks and the Internet Domain Name System, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS.
L. 149, 164 (2000).
66 See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)
(West Supp. 2000).
67 See, e.g., Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1325 (9th Cir.
1998) (holding that the offer to sell domain names to trademark owners whose
marks were incorporated in the domain names was use in commerce).
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registrant uses the name). And, early on, courts seized on a
single line of the legislative history of the federal dilution
statute68 to support the notion that the dilution law enacted
in 1995 was aimed in part at abusive domain name
registration—without any real consideration of whether the
particular mark in question was famous, or whether the use
in question diluted the distinctiveness of the mark,69 both of
which (along with use in commerce) are prerequisites for a
dilution claim. Indeed, this trend was so pervasive that some
commentators started to reconceptualize dilution case law as
covering three cases:
tarnishment, blurring, and
cybersquatting.70 Despite these largely pro-mark owner
developments—and perhaps to avoid this level of creativity in
adjudication—the new legislation (the Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act) creates a cause of action based on
bad faith registration of a domain name that is identical or
confusingly similar to the plaintiff’s trademark (without any
requirement of famousness, consumer confusion, dilution, or
use in commerce).71 It also introduced an action in rem
against the domain name, which is intended to address (and
is limited to) the situation where the defendant is not subject
to the personal jurisdiction of the U.S. courts.72
If we adopt the notion of revising the systems separately,
however, it would not prevent decisions made in one sphere
from affecting the development of principles in the other.73
68 See 141 CONG. REC. S19312 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Leahy) (“[I]t is my hope that this antidilution statute can help stem the use of
deceptive Internet addresses taken by those who are choosing marks that are
associated with the products and reputations of others.”).
69 Cf. Krafte-Jacobs, supra note 61.
70 See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 24.67 (4th ed. 1997).
71 In the case of famous marks, protection extends against acts of bad faith
registration of a domain name that is dilutive of the famous mark. See 15 U.S.C.A. §
1125(d) (West Supp. 2000).
72 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(2) (West Supp. 2000). The provision has been
useful for trademark owners, even where narrowly interpreted by the courts. See
BroadBridge Media, L.L.C. v. Hypercd.com, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426, 1441
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)-(2)) (ordering registrar to transfer the
domain name to the plaintiff despite requiring in rem plaintiff to show that
defendant domain name registrant, over whom the court had no personal
jurisdiction, had a bad faith intent to profit from the registered mark).
73 Cf. Litman, supra note 65, at 165 (arguing that the domain name system
should be designed in ways that make sense “from technical and Internet policy
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In particular, decisions by ICANN on the structure of the
domain name system will affect the ways in which consumers
perceive domain names and thus how trademark rights are
affected by the use of trademarks as domain names. Most
notable among these decisions is the development of
additional generic top-level domains.74 This is not a wholly
new suggestion. It can be found in proposals put forward by
the International Ad-Hoc Committee in 1998,75 and was
recently accepted by ICANN.76 Trademark owners have in
recent years vigorously opposed these attempts, arguing that
this was a recipe for more confusion. If Apple Computer had
failed to register apple.com, and .com was the only generic
top-level domain in which registrations were freely available,
then Apple Computer would only have to deal with one
unscrupulous defendant. However, offer the name in four
domains and Apple would have to pursue four claims; offer
the name in twelve and the costs increase proportionately.
So the argument goes. Indeed, if one assumed that Apple
Computer, even after obtaining the rights in the APPLE mark
in each top-level domain, would have to monitor all similar
domain names (e.g., applepc.com), then the costs may
become quite significant.
But this argument rests on the premise that permitting
use of the mark in any other domain name for any other type
of good will impinge upon the rights of the trademark owner.
vantage points rather than one that elevates today’s marketing plans into the
rationale for the architecture of the Internet”).
74 This may provide a vehicle for the courts to get out from under the different
layers of early decision-making and reassess the proper scope of protection for
trademarks vis-à-vis third party domain name registrants. Such a development
would parallel software copyright jurisprudence; courts sought initially to provide a
broad, secure environment for intellectual property owners operating in new
technologies, only to scale back protection as the technology matured. Compare
Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Labs., 797 F.2d 1222, 1237 (3d Cir. 1986), with
Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing
overprotection by the Whelan court).
75 The International Ad-Hoc Committee was comprised of both trademark
owners and a variety of Internet organizations. Another important aspect of its
proposal was that the group would assume responsibility for generic top-level
domain name registration from Network Solutions, Inc. For a discussion of the
Committee’s proposals, see Liu, supra note 5, at 600-04.
76 See ICANN, PRELIMINARY REPORT: MEETING OF THE ICANN BOARD IN
YOKOHAMA, supra note 37 (approving resolution authorizing new top-level
domains).
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This need not be the case. It will depend in large part on
how the new generic top-level domains are allocated, what
generic domains are chosen, how consumer use and
understanding of the different domains evolves, what limits
exist
on
registration,
and
whether
technological
developments change the use of domain names in social
habits. Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
already recognized (in the context of existing generic toplevel domains) that use of the mark as a domain name in one
generic domain may be different from use in another.77
Similarly, if, for example, ICANN supported the establishment
of a domain with negative connotations (such as .sucks, or
.hurl),78 it is arguable79 that consumers would not be
confused about any association between Apple computers
and apple.sucks and would develop an understanding that
.sucks addresses were affirmatively unconnected to the
owners of the mark.80 Such a development might give
77 See Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 880 (9th Cir. 1999)
(declining to automatically extend case law regarding the dilution caused by use of
domain name registrations in the .com domain to registrations in the .net domain,
and concluding that “although evidence on the record . . . demonstrates that the
.com and .net distinction is illusory, a factfinder could infer that dilution does not
occur with a trademark.net registration” thus precluding summary judgment for the
plaintiff).
78 The Consumer Project on Technology indicated its intention to apply to
manage a new top-level domain name called .sucks. See Jon Swarz, Dot-Com, Meet
Dot-Biz: More Domains in Sight, USA TODAY, Aug. 3, 2000, at B3. For an overview of
the process of applying for new top-level domains, see ICANN, NEW TLD
APPLICATION PROCESS OVERVIEW, supra note 12; see also ICANN, TLD
APPLICATIONS LODGED (Oct. 2, 2000) (listing applications to sponsor new top-level
domains, and the domains for which sponsorship was sought), at
http://www.icann.org/tlds/tld-applications-lodged-02oct00.htm. The selection of
new domains, and of the operators of each new domain, will be made in accordance
with criteria consistent with the ICANN Board’s resolution in Yokohama. See
ICANN, PRELIMINARY REPORT: MEETING OF THE ICANN BOARD IN
YOKOHAMA, supra note 37.
79 Although experience in the context of parody cases suggests that this might
require some revision of attitudes (or the development of a sense of humor) in some
courts. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 777-79 (8th Cir.
1994) (finding parody infringed plaintiff’s trademark).
80 Whether, and to what extent, these perceptions would develop might depend
upon whether trademark owners could or would register in the .sucks domain.
(Permitting the Microsoft Corporation ownership of microsoft.sucks might be as
socially inadvisable as permitting the Apple Corporation to own microsoft.com.)
Rules that incentivize (or enable) mark owners to do so should be avoided because
they would merely result in trademark owners incurring yet more wasted costs and
would stifle an avenue of criticism. Indeed, restrictions on who could own names in
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recognition to the free speech and other countervailing
concerns found in existing trademark law without imperiling
trademark owners’ legitimate defenses against unfair
competition.81 Thus, although developing independently, the
domain name system could be crafted with an eye to
ensuring that trademark values (whether the affirmative
values of protection or the correspondingly important limits
on protection) are not threatened.
If we decide that the two systems should develop in
parallel, guided by the independent policy objectives
underlying each system, then the debate will focus on what
those objectives are. The trademark debate is essentially
one of applying, rather than constructing, those objectives.
To be sure, the recent expansions of trademark protection
can be framed in terms of a drift from a tort-based to a
property-based notion of trademarks. In practical terms,
however, the real debate is a question of degree: what level
and kinds of confusion will we tolerate among consumers,
and how remote must a threat to a trademark’s goodwill be
before we permit it? The former can be developed by courts
taking proper account of purchasing practices in cyberspace.
The latter is a more troubling question. Indeed, I have
argued elsewhere that it is an inquiry without any helpful
internal compass, and that any certainty of content will only
come from coupling the inquiry with analysis of consumer
confusion.82 These are classical trademark debates, not new
debates inspired by cyberspace. But if consumers are
the new domains, reflecting initial practices in the existing top-level domains, might
be useful in this regard. The published criteria for new domains envisage both
unrestricted top-level domain names (with no enforced restrictions on who may
apply for registration within the domain or on what uses may be made of those
registrations) and restricted top-level domains (with restrictions of either or both
kind). See ICANN, NEW TLD APPLICATION PROCESS OVERVIEW, supra note 12.
81 For an interesting discussion of the circumstances that might warrant
ordering the transfer of ownership of domain names that use components clearly
connoting criticism (such as harvardsucks.com), see Standard Chartered PLC v.
Purge I.T., No. D2000-0681 (WIPO Arb. and Med. Ctr. Panel Aug. 13, 2000), at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/d2000-0681.html.
While
permitting registration of such domain names by persons seeking to sell the domain
name back to the mark holder for profit (i.e., cybersquatters) might serve no useful
purpose, it also is not clear that a transfer back to the mark owner would be the ideal
response.
82 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Rational Limits of Trademark Protection, in U.S.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY (Hansen ed., forthcoming 2000).
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cyberactors (and they are), then the practices of the domain
name system will and must inform that debate. The domain
name system here does not revamp the principles of
trademark law; it simply shapes their application consistent
with long-defined public policy objectives.
In the domain name context, there needs to be candid
debate about the value of permitting speculation in property
that has significant commercial, social, and political
significance. This independent inquiry into domain name
system values will inevitably be more in the nature of an
articulation of first principles than of trademark law; this is
too new a regime to have settled on the values in as fixed a
manner as trademark law. Just as the domain name system
affected the independent assessment of trademark law, so
too the lessons of trademark law might helpfully inform the
construction of the domain name regime, including a
recognition that certain terms are too important to be the
property of a single individual.
4. CONCLUSION
Analysis of the problems facing the domain name system
illustrates well the challenges posed in asking, “What law
controls in cyberspace?” The question is unlikely to produce
a single “law.” The rules that will control the allocation and
use of domain names, a prototypically cyberspace activity,
will inevitably (and perhaps appropriately) reflect laws that
are national, international, and supranational in nature. They
will be developed in quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial fora
that are national, international, and supranational in nature.
The rules will also challenge conceptual boundaries of
trademark law that have placed the United States apart from
the rest of the world. Such prognostication might appear
prosaic. And in some sense it is. But its prosaic nature
masks an exciting future, because it can scarcely be doubted
that many previously impregnable boundaries—geographic
and conceptual—will be shattered in that process.

